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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

IMMINENT CHANGE: A RECOMMENDED RESPONSE FOR
MISSOURI IN THE WAKE OF THE SUPREME COURT’S EMINENT
DOMAIN DECISION IN KELO v. CITY OF NEW LONDON

I. INTRODUCTION
“A man’s home is his castle,” 1 but not if his municipality wants to build a
Wal-Mart. An individual’s home holds a unique place in United States
jurisprudence. 2 It is protected from a myriad of intrusions, 3 but it appears it is
not protected from the almighty dollar. The power of eminent domain is
granted to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment and to local
state governments through their own respective constitutional provisions. 4 In
particular, the Fifth Amendment establishes that an individual’s private
property will not be taken from him and put to public use unless just
compensation is paid. 5 The Takings Clause is a very small notation in our
Constitution, but recently its interpretation has sparked enormous scholarly

1. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 229 (1981).
2. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (“[N]either history nor this Nation’s
experience requires us to disregard overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been
embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.”).
3. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (home is protected from thermal
imaging); Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (home is protected from residential picketing);
FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (home is proteced from the broadcast media).
4. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 24; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 18; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 17;
ARK CONST. art. II, § 22; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19; COL. CONST. art. II, §§ 14-15; CONN. CONST.
art. I, § 11; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 8; FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6; GA. CONST. art. I, § 3, P 1; HAW.
CONST. art. I, § 20; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 14; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 15; IND. CONST. art. I, § 21;
IOWA CONST. art. I, § 18; KAN. Const. art. XII, § 4; KY. CONST. § 13; LA. CONST. art. I § 4; ME.
CONST. art. I, § 21; MD. CONST. art. III, §§ 40-40A; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. X; MICH. CONST.
art. X, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13; MISS. CONSt. art. III, § 17; MO. CONST. art. I, §§ 26-28;
MONT. CONST. art. II § 29; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 21; Nev. CONST. art. I, § 8; N.H. CONST. pt. 1,
art. 12; N.J. CONST. art. I, P 20; N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 20; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7; N.C. CONST.
art. I, § 19; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 16; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 19; OKLA. CONST. art. II, §§ 23-24;
OR. CONST. art. I, § 18; PA. CONST. art. I, § 10; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 16; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 13;
S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 13; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 21; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17; UTAH CONST. art.
I, § 22; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 2; VA. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 11; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16; W. VA.
CONST. art. III, § 9; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 13; WYO. CONST. art. I, §§ 32-33.
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.”). That Clause is made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
449
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debate throughout the country. 6 At the center of this debate is the Supreme
Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London. 7 The 5-4 opinion held that
New London’s decision to use eminent domain to take property for the purpose
of economic development did indeed satisfy the public use requirement of the
Fifth Amendment. 8 At first glance, the decision seems to be utterly
inconsistent with the text of the Constitution, but upon further investigation the
holding is merely the final result of a natural progression of years of decisions
which have gradually eroded individual property rights through eminent
domain.
Despite the defeat of individual property rights advocates in this particular
case, the Supreme Court noted that individual states had the ability to limit or
restrict eminent domain powers as they wished. 9 As a result, the Kelo decision
has placed the eminent domain controversy at the forefront of political debate
in numerous state legislatures across the country, including Missouri, because
at the moment it appears all property is subject to eminent domain so long as
the proposed “new use” creates general economic benefits for the city. 10
Currently Alabama, Delaware, Texas, and Ohio have enacted legislation which
restricts the government’s ability to exercise its eminent domain power. 11 This
comment will examine the legislation of those states that have restricted the
government’s taking power and also examine the possible actions the Missouri
General Assembly could take in response to the Kelo decision. As of this time
of this writing, Missouri has not enacted legislation to restrict eminent domain
powers. Action must be taken in order to preserve its citizens’ property rights
and to limit the scope of eminent domain powers.
A.

The Kelo Case

The controversy in this case centers on the town of New London,
Connecticut. 12 The city was designated a “distressed municipality” in 1990.13
The Naval Undersea Warfare Center, which had employed 1,500 people in the
6. See, e.g., Ashley J. Fuhrmeister, In the Name of Economic Development: Reviving
“Public Use” as a Limitation on the Eminent Domain Power in the Wake of Kelo v. City of New
London, 54 DRAKE L. R. 171 (2005).
7. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct 2655 (2005).
8. Id. at 2665.
9. Id. at 2668.
10. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Eminent Domain-2005 State Legislation,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/natres/post-keloleg.htm (last visited June 11, 2006) (a web site
dedicated to keeping track of all eminent domain legislation introduced across the United States
after the Kelo decision) [hereinafter National Conference]; see also Furhmeister, supra note 6, at
178.
11. See ALA CODE § 11-47-170; DEL CODE ANN TIT. 29, § 9505 (2005); S.B. 167, 126th
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2206.001 (Vernon 2005).
12. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658.
13. Id.
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town, was closed by the federal government in 1996, and in 1998 the city’s
unemployment rate became double the average of the rest of the state. 14 In
order to aid the struggling community, state officials sought the help of a
private, the New London Development Corporation (“NLDC”), nonprofit
group, to develop an economic revitalization plan for the community. 15 To
assist the NLDC, the state legislature approved the issuance of bonds totaling
around fifteen million dollars in January of 1998. 16 One month later, Pfizer,
Inc. announced plans for a three hundred million dollar research center in the
community which local officials hoped would jumpstart the area’s
resurgence. 17
The NLDC continued to develop its revitalization plans, and submitted
their formal plans to the appropriate state agencies for approval. 18 The final
plan involved ninety acres in the Fort Trumbull area of the city. 19 The
development plan contained seven parcels which were made up of around 115
privately owned properties, and thirty-two acres of the previously closed Navy
base. 20 Each parcel was individually designated for a specific development,
and the NLDC hoped this would attract new commerce to the community. 21
The city council approved the final plan, and according to state statute, chose
the NLDC as the development agent. 22 The NLDC had the ability to purchase
all the private property required in the plan or to use the city’s eminent domain
power. 23 The NLDC purchased all but fifteen of the properties. 24 As a result,
condemnation proceedings were brought against the owners of the fifteen
properties, and the owners subsequently filed an action claiming these
14. Id.
15. Id. at 2659.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. The development plan involved seven individual parcels. Parcel 1 was designated for
a conference hotel in the center of a “small urban village” which was comprised of restaurants
and shopping. Parcel 2 was to be the site of eighty new residential properties connected by a
walkway to the rest of the development. Parcel 3 was to contain about 90,000 square feet of
research and development office space. Parcel 4A contained 2.4 acres and it was to be used to
support the state park or the marina by providing parking and retail facilities. Parcel 4B included
the marina and the last stretch of the river walk. Parcels 5, 6, and 7, provided additional land for
future development of offices, retail stores, parking, or marine commercial uses. Id.
22. “Any municipality which has a planning commission is authorized, by vote of its
legislative body, to designate the economic development commission or the redevelopment
agency of such municipality or a nonprofit development corporation as its development agency
and exercise through such agency the powers granted under this chapter . . . .” CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 8-188 (2005).
23. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660.
24. Id.
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attempted takings were in violation of the Fifth Amendment because these
properties were not designated as blighted, and the condemnation actions arose
solely because of their location in the development plan. 25
In December of 2000, the case was heard in the New London Superior
Court. 26 The court approved half of the takings, and held the other half
unconstitutional, causing both parties to appeal the decision to the Supreme
Court of Connecticut. 27 The Connecticut Supreme Court approved all of the
takings, reasoning that they were valid under the state’s municipal
development statute. 28 The Connecticut Supreme Court also held that
economic development was a public use. 29 This decision was appealed, and
the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide if the power of eminent
domain allowed a state to take private property for economic development
under the Fifth Amendment. 30
The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the Connecticut Supreme Court’s
decision, holding that the city’s exercise of eminent domain power with the
goal of economic development was constitutional under the Fifth
Amendment. 31 While this decision is troubling to individual property rights
advocates because it seemingly broadens the scope of the state’s eminent
domain powers, Kelo was the result of the proper application of years of legal
precedent. The problem with Kelo is not the holding itself, but rather with the
likely effects of the holding. All property is now theoretically subject to
eminent domain proceedings if restrictive eminent domain legislation is not
enacted. This note examines recent history of eminent domain decisions by the
Supreme Court before Kelo, individual state reactions to the Kelo decision, and
suggests the direction Missouri should take so that its legislature can enact
meaningful legislation which would establish boundaries for the exercise of
eminent domain.

25. Nine petitioners filed a claim under the Fifth Amendment. Four of the remaining fifteen
properties were in Parcel 3 and eleven were Parcel 4A. The owners occupied ten of the parcels,
while five were held as investment properties. Id. at 2660.
26. Id.
27. See id. Properties in Parcel 4A were granted a permanent restraining order. Id.
28. The development statute states:
[P]ermitting and assisting municipalities to acquire and improve unified land and water
areas and to acquire and improve or demolish vacated commercial plants for industrial
and business purposes and, in distressed municipalities, to lend funds to businesses and
industries within a project area in accordance with such planning objectives are public
uses and purposes for which public moneys may be expended; and that the necessity in
the public interest for the provisions of this chapter is hereby declared as a matter of
legislative determination.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 8-186 (2005).
29. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660.
30. Id. at 2661.
31. Id. at 2665.
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II. HISTORY
The Kelo decision hinged on whether a city’s plan for economic
development was a public purpose under the Fifth Amendment. 32 The
Supreme Court has previously recognized three different categories of takings
which have been held to meet the constitutional requirement of the Takings
Clause. 33
A.

Three Recognized Constitutional Takings through the Eminent Domain
Power

Two of three categories are relatively simple. 34 The first category is where
the state or federal government exercises its eminent domain power to transfer
individual private property to the general public. 35 Different examples of this
category include situations where a government takes private land and converts
it into “a road, a hospital, or a military base.” 36 A second category of takings
allows the state to take private property and pass it to private parties. 37 These
private parties, however, must develop the land for use by the public. 38
Specific examples of this eminent domain power include “a railroad, a public
utility, or a stadium.” 39
A third category has developed because not every situation can be easily
placed into the previous categories. 40 The two categories are simply too
narrow to encompass the entire reach of the Takings Clause. 41 As a result, the
Supreme Court has ruled takings constitutional where the taking eventually
serves a public purpose even though the property will be for private use. 42
This third category began to develop in 1954 in Berman v. Parker, 43 where
the Supreme Court upheld a plan which designated a blighted area in
Washington, D.C. for redevelopment. 44 The targeted area had about 5,000
residents, and most of their housing was not repairable. 45 The plan proposed
32. Id. at 2663 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2673 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
36. See, e.g., Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55 (1925); Rindge Co. v.
County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923).
37. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2673 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407 (1992);
Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Ala. Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30 (1916).
40. Kelo, 125 S. Ct at 2673 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
41. Id.
42. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26
(1954).
43. Berman, 348 U.S. 26.
44. Id. at 29.
45. Id.
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condemning the area and constructing public facilities. 46 Any remaining land
could be sold to private parties for other purposes, such as low-cost housing. 47
A department store owner challenged the condemnation plan because his
store was in good repair. 48 He argued that the proposed governmental goal of
a “better balanced, more attractive community” did not satisfy the public use
requirement of the Fifth Amendment. 49 The Court rejected this argument and
upheld the taking, reasoning that community development programs cannot be
examined on an individual basis. 50 The Court also gave great deference to the
decisions made by the legislature in determining which development projects a
community chose to implement. 51
Thirty years later in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 52 the Supreme
Court was once again confronted with the question of whether a public purpose
taking can be constitutional under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 53 A land condemnation plan was challenged where title was
taken away from lessors and given to lessees. 54 The Hawaiian government
developed the plan in order to increase the number of owners of real
property. 55 At the time of the plan a majority of the state’s land was in control
of the state government, federal government, and seventy-two private
landowners. 56 The legislature determined that the concentration of land
ownership was “skewing the State’s residential fees simple market, inflating
land prices, and injuring the public tranquility and welfare.” 57

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Berman, 348 U.S. at 29.
50. Id. at 35 (“If owner after owner were permitted to resist these redevelopment programs
on the ground that his particular property was not being used against the public interest,
integrated plans for redevelopment would suffer greatly.”).
51. Id. at 33 (“We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not
desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. . . . The values it represents
are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the
legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as
well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In the present case, the Congress and
its authorized agencies have made determinations that take into account a wide variety of values.
It is not for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the
Nation’s Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment
that stands in the way.”).
52. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 230.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 232. The state and the federal government owned about forty-nine percent of
the state’s land, while another forty-seven percent was owned by a group of seventy-two private
citizens. Id.
57. Id.
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In Midkiff, just as in Berman, the Court upheld the taking and transfer of
the land by power of eminent domain. 58 Once again the Court gave great
deference to the legislature’s developmental determination. 59 The Supreme
Court held that a state’s wish to diminish the “social and economic evils of a
land oligopoly” is a public use under the Fifth Amendment despite the fact that
in certain instances, property was essentially being transferred from one citizen
to another for private use. 60
III. DISCUSSION
A.

The Kelo Decision

The Kelo case was originally heard in the New London Superior Court,
which approved half of the takings, and held the other half unconstitutional,
causing both parties to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court of
Connecticut. 61 Subsequently, the Connecticut Supreme Court approved all of
the takings, reasoning they were valid because of the state’s municipal
development statute. 62 The Connecticut Supreme Court also held that
economic development was a public use. 63 This decision was appealed, and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the petitioners’ Fifth
Amendment claims. 64

58. See infra pp. 20-24 for a thorough discussion outlining the reasoning behind the
deference afforded to the legislatures by the Supreme Court when the legislature makes a “public
use” determination.
59. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 232. (“Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the
right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the power of eminent
domain is merely the means to the end. . . . Once the object is within the authority of Congress,
the means by which it will be attained is also for Congress to determine. Here one of the means
chosen is the use of private enterprise for redevelopment of the area. Appellants argue that this
makes the project a taking from one businessman for the benefit of another businessman. But the
means of executing the project are for Congress and Congress alone to determine, once the public
purpose has been established.” (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)).
60. Id. at 241-42.
61. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2660 (2005).
62. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-186 (2005) (The development statute states that “permitting
and assisting municipalities to acquire and improve unified land and water areas and to acquire
and improve or demolish vacated commercial plants for industrial and business purposes and, in
distressed municipalities, to lend funds to businesses and industries within a project area in
accordance with such planning objectives are public uses and purposes for which public moneys
may be expended; and that the necessity in the public interest for the provisions of this chapter is
hereby declared as a matter of legislative determination.”).
63. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660.
64. See id. at 2658.
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The Majority Opinion

The Kelo case presented the Court with the opportunity to decide whether
the City of New London’s proposed economic development plan, and
subsequent use of its eminent domain power, qualified as a constitutional
“taking” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. 65 Justice Stevens
authored the Court’s majority opinion. 66 The opinion began with a brief
introduction into the meaning of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. 67
Justice Stevens saw two clear categories of eminent domain cases in which the
law was unambiguous. 68
Justice Stevens first noted it was well settled law that the government
could not take the property of one individual and transfer it solely to another
individual even if compensation was paid. 69 It was clear no entity can take a
citizen’s land to provide a private benefit to an individual. 70 The majority also
noted the government could not use its eminent domain power “under the mere
pretext” of a public use. 71 The Kelo case, however, did not fit into either of
these categories, as the City of New London had a legitimate economic plan
for the area and that plan was adopted for no particular individual. 72
By way of contrast, the majority opinion noted it was equally well settled
law that the government could take an individual’s property and open it for
general public use such as a road or a park. 73 The Kelo case, likewise, did not
fit into this judicial category. 74 Rather, the Kelo case was decided solely on
whether the plan for New London constituted a “public purpose.” 75
The Court has given a broad interpretation to the term “public purpose.” 76
The rationale behind this interpretation was that a bright line, narrow
interpretation of this term would be unworkable as a judicial standard because
society and its needs are fluid, and thus no consistency could exist. 77
Consequently, legislatures have been granted wide latitude by the courts to
decide what actually constituted a “public purpose.” 78 The majority opinion
then went on to explain recent decisions which illustrated the Court’s adoption

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 2665.
Id. at 2658.
Id. at 2662.
Id.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2662.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663.
Id.
Id. at 2664.
Id.
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of the broader definition. 79 The opinion cited Berman v. Parker, 80 in which
the Supreme Court refused to examine an individual eminent domain
challenge. 81 The Court reasoned that in order for a development plan to work,
the government or agency must be able to plan the area as a whole. 82 In the
unanimous decision, great deference was granted to the legislature to plan
redevelopment projects, and the Court reiterated its view that the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment should be interpreted broadly. 83
The majority opinion subsequently cited Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff, 84 which reaffirmed the deference given to the legislature to develop
land use projects. 85 The fact that land was in some cases transferred directly
from one individual to another did not affect the outcome of the case. 86 The
Court noted that “it is only the takings purpose, and not its mechanics” that is
relevant for the determination of public use. 87 The Court reasoned that the
legislature’s goal of eliminating the “social and economic evils of land
oligopoly” was indeed a public use within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment. 88
With this background and precedent, the majority opinion proceeded to
apply the developed law to the situation in New London. The opinion
conceded that the city of New London was not faced with a “need to remove
blight,” but nonetheless the majority believed the poor economic situation
entitled the legislature’s decision to judicial deference as had occurred in both
Berman and Midkiff. 89 Citing a detailed economic plan, careful legislative
reflection throughout the process, and the decision in Berman, the majority
chose to make the ruling based on the developmental plan as a whole, rather
than on each individual claim. 90 In this light, the majority ultimately rejected
the petitioner’s Fifth Amendment argument and held that the plan did qualify
as a public purpose. 91
In reaching this decision, the majority refuted a number of the petitioners’
arguments. 92 The petitioners’ first argument was that in no case can economic

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 2663-64.
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
Id. at 28.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 33 (“The concept of public welfare is broad and inclusive.”).
Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
Id. at 241-42.
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2663 (2005).
Id. at 2664.
Id. (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241-42).
Id.
Id. at 2665.
Id.
See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665, 2667.
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development qualify as a public use. 93 The majority dismissed this contention,
stating that it was supported by neither “precedent nor logic.” 94 The opinion
proclaimed that it was impossible to discern a difference between economic
development and other kinds of public uses. 95 Economic development as a
public purpose was consistent with the broad interpretation of the Takings
Clause recognized by the Court throughout its recent history. 96
The majority opinion continued by refuting petitoners’ notion that
economic developments “blur[] the boundary between public and private
takings.” 97 The Court reasoned that often times a public purpose benefits
private individuals and that the petitioners’ same argument was already heard
and denied in Berman. 98 The majority cited numerous cases in which the
public good or public purpose goes hand-in-hand with a benefit for private
parties. 99
Additionally, the Court refused to rule on petitioners’ contention that after
this ruling nothing would stand in the way of a city taking a citizen’s land and
giving it to another citizen solely to produce more tax dollars. 100 The Court’s
rationale was that if such hypotheticals arose, they will be confronted in due
time. 101 The majority felt no need to rule on a case that was not before
them. 102
Petitioners’ final argument which the majority addressed was the notion
that the Court should adopt a “reasonable certainty” requirement that the
proclaimed public benefits will be realized. 103 The Court refused to adopt such
a standard because the majority reasoned it would represent a significant break
from past precedent. 104 The Court had previously declined to engage in
“empirical debates” over legislative plans, and the majority saw no need to
change that approach. 105 Likewise, the Court reasoned that if it were required
to engage in such empirical debates, it would take extraordinary amounts of
time, which would create a significant barrier to numerous potential
development plans. 106 The Court refused to “second guess” a legislature’s
93. Id. at 2665.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2666.
98. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2666 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954)).
99. See id. (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 422
(1992); Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003)).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2667.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2667.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2668.
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determination as to what property needed to be condemned in order to see the
development plan come to fruition. 107
Despite ruling against the petitioners, the Court concluded the opinion with
an invitation for state governments and officials to further define their eminent
domain powers. 108 The Court held that the opinion placed no limits or
restrictions on a state’s ability to create stricter requirements for the takings
power different than the “federal baseline.” 109 The Court noted that many
states already had stricter requirements either through their constitutions or
eminent domain statutes. 110 The majority conceded that the use of eminent
domain for economic development is a matter for “public debate,” but
attempted to distance themselves from this debate as they acknowledged that
the Court’s only responsibility was to determine if a city’s economic
development plan is a “public use” within the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 111
C. Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennedy authored the concurring opinion. 112 In his determination,
a taking is constitutionally valid so long as the taking is “rationally related to a
conceivable public purpose.” 113 Justice Kennedy continued by comparing the
deferential standard pronounced in other Fifth Amendment Takings cases to
that of the rational basis test used by the Court in Due Process cases. 114 He
tempered this analogy, however, by noting that any takings which benefit
particular individuals “with only incidental or pretextual public benefits” are
not valid within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment and must be renounced
by the Court. 115 Justice Kennedy declared the proper determination of a public
taking was whether the proposed public purpose is incidental to the benefits
provided to individuals. If so, then the taking should be declared invalid. 116
The examination of the proposed taking began with the presumption that
the government’s plans were rational. 117 The assumption by the Court should
be that the plans of a government will serve a public purpose. 118 Justice
Kennedy continued by examining the Kelo facts, citing testimony,

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668.
Id.
Id. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
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documentary evidence, and economic statistics relied on by the trial court to
show that the public benefits in the instant case are more than merely
incidental. 119 He disputed the idea that the plan was conceived with the
intention to benefit a single private entity. 120
The concurring opinion subsequently addressed the petitioners’ argument
that the Court should adopt a “per se rule” to invalidate takings justified
through economic development. 121 Justice Kennedy found no merit to this
argument because such a broad rule would hurt the efficiency of certain
development projects intended to benefit the public. 122 However, it is
noteworthy that the opinion does suggest that certain takings may require a
stricter standard than that of Midkiff and Berman so that the Court can ensure
the constitutional qualifications are met. 123 Justice Kennedy, however, does
not provide specifics on what certain situations may call for the heightened
standard. 124
D. The O’Connor Dissent
Justice O’Connor authored the first dissent. 125 Justice O’Connor noted that
a great principle of our system is that property cannot be taken from person A
and given to person B. The people would not entrust a government with the
ability to do this. 126 The dissent concluded that the Kelo decision has
“abandon[ed]” this governmental limitation. 127 As a result, “all private
property” was in danger of this fate under the vague notion of economic
development. 128 The only qualification was that the land must be put to a more

119. See id. (“The trial court considered testimony from government officials and corporate
officers; documentary evidence of communications between these parties; respondents’
awareness of New London’s depressed economic condition and evidence corroborating the
validity of this concern; the substantial commitment of public funds by the State to the
development project before most of the private beneficiaries were known; evidence that
respondents reviewed a variety of development plans and chose a private developer from a group
of applicants rather than picking out a particular transferee beforehand; and the fact that the other
private beneficiaries of the project are still unknown because the office space proposed to be built
has not yet been rented.”).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2670 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
122. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2670.
123. See id. (citing Eastern Enter. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 549-50 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2671 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
126. Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
127. Id.
128. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2671.
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lucrative use. 129 Post Kelo, no line can be drawn between what constitutes a
private taking and what constitutes a public taking. 130
The dissent next addressed the Fifth Amendment and its limitations. 131
The Justices relied on the text of the Fifth Amendment for their discussion.132
There are two inherent limitations on the power of eminent domain in the
United States. 133 The first is that “the taking must be for a public use and [the
second is that] just compensation must be paid to the owner.” 134 These
limitations protect individuals against an unjust sovereign. 135 In particular, the
public use qualification establishes the “very scope of the eminent domain
power.” 136
The dissent conceded that the Court has given great deference to legislative
determinations on public projects, but the dissenting Justices acknowledge that
the Court must maintain its duty to uphold the Constitution. 137 As a result, it is
up to the Court to decide if a public taking is truly public or if it is a private
taking. 138 This duty cannot be simply disregarded. 139
The dissent subsequently explained the three types of takings cases that
have been recognized by the Court. 140 It was acknowledged that the Court is
guided by stare decisis, and in particular, its holdings in Berman and Midkiff,
but distinguishes those cases from the immediate set of facts in Kelo. 141 In
both Berman and Midkiff, there was a tangible harm being inflicted upon those
communities. 142 In Berman, poverty created an area in Washington D.C.
which became blighted, and in Midkiff, the real estate market was distorted
because ownership of the land was so concentrated. 143 The use of eminent
domain in those respective cases “directly achieved a public benefit,” and it
was irrelevant that the land was placed in private hands. 144 No such

129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 2672 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). The Fifth Amendment provides that “private
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
132. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2672 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[W]e begin with the
unremarkable presumption that every word in the document has independent meaning . . . .”).
133. Id.
134. See id. (quoting Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 231-32 (2003)).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2673.
137. Id.
138. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2673 (“It is well established that . . . the question [of] what is a
public use is a judicial one.”).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 2674.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2674 (O’ Connor, J., dissenting).
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circumstance exist the Kelo case. 145 The petitioners’ homes were neither
blighted nor contributing to any “social harm.” 146 The public benefits that the
majority believes the economic development will contribute to, things such as
increased taxes and jobs, are entirely incidental. 147 The dissent felt the
majority had unexplainably broadened the scope of “public use” because it had
abandoned the harmful property use precedent of Berman and Midkiff. 148 This
new standard allows the government to take land at will because “any lawful
use of real private property can be said to generate some incidental benefit to
the public.” 149 The public use limitation essentially loses all of its meaning. 150
The dissent criticized the majority because the holding provides no
direction or standard on how the Court is to examine future public taking
questions. 151 The majority matter of factly concluded that the facts will be
examined when they are provided to the Court, but no specifics were given as
to what the Justices should look for to determine if a true public taking has
occurred within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. 152 The dissenting
Justices were also troubled because in economic development takings, the
private benefits and incidental public benefits are “merged and mutually
reinforcing.” 153 Despite the true motives of the government, incidental public
benefits will always occur if the land is put into private individuals’ hands, and
as a result, an argument can always be made that the use is serving a public
purpose. 154
In addition, the dissenting Justices found nothing unique about the
particular facts of the Kelo case. 155 The dissent did not find it significant that
there were detailed development plans, or that there were many legislative
studies trying to determine the exact amount of incidental public benefits.156
The facts were not of any legal consequence, and there was nothing in the
majority’s opinion to suggest what level of detail was needed or how much
revenue or jobs must be created in order for development plans in future cases
to reach the significance they seemed to reach in the Kelo case. 157 The dissent
concluded by noting that the majority’s suggestion of reliance on state
145. Id. at 2674-75.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2675 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
148. See id. (“In moving away from our decisions sanctioning the condemnation of harmful
property use, the Court today significantly expands the meaning of public use.”).
149. Id.
150. Kelo, 125 S. Ct at 2673.
151. Id. at 2675.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See id. at 2676.
155. Id.
156. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2676.
157. Id..
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governments to limit economic development takings was “an abdication of our
responsibility.” 158
E.

The Thomas Dissent

Justice Thomas authored the second dissent. 159 He was adamant that the
Court abandoned the text of the Constitution in order to reach its holding. 160
He argued that the Constitution allows a government to take an individual’s
property only if the government plans to control the land or if the land can be
used by the public. 161 Justice Thomas qualified his reading of the Constitution
with a thorough documentation of the history and meaning of such words as
“use,” 162 “public use,” 163 and “general welfare.” 164
Justice Thomas continued in his critique of the holding by laying out the
history of the Court’s “Public Use Clause jurisprudence.” 165 He contended
that the Court has made two distinct mistakes throughout its recent history in
this legal area. 166 The first of these errors was the “adopt[ion of] the ‘public
purpose’ interpretation of the clause,” while the second was “in cases deferring
to legislatures’ judgments regarding what constitutes a valid public
purpose.” 167 The genesis of the former concept originates in dictum in
Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley 168 and the latter from United States v.

158. Id. at 2677.
159. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
160. See id. at 2678 (“If such economic development takings are for a public purpose, any
taking is, and the Court has erased the Public Use Clause from our Constitution . . . .”).
161. Id.
162. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct at 2679 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The definition of “use” is “the act
of employing any thing to any purpose.” Justice Thomas does not understand how a government
could give land to a private person or entity and claim that the public was using the land,
regardless of any benefits bestowed upon the public. He concedes there may be broader
definitions for “use,” but does not find them in the text of the Constitution. Id.
163. See id. “Public use” must mean “the government or its citizens as a whole must actually
‘employ’ the taken property.” Id.
164. See id. If the Founding Fathers had wished to grant such broad powers with the Takings
Clause, they would have used a word such as “general welfare” as they had in other parts of the
Constitution. This can only seem to mean that the Framers had a narrow view of government’s
power under the Takings clause. Id.
165. See id. at 2682 (Thomas, C., dissenting).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. 164 U.S. 112 (1896). The issue in Bradley was whether land could be taken under
eminent domain for the construction of an irrigation ditch. Id. at 161. The Court declared the
taking was a public use because “[t]o irrigate and thus to bring into possible cultivation these
large masses of otherwise worthless lands would seem to be a public purpose and a matter of
public interest, not confined to landowners, or even to any one section of the state.” Id.
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Gettysburg Electric Railroad Co. 169 He opined that the Court incorporated
these two concepts into its lines of reasoning in public use analysis with no
apparent authority, but previous dictum. 170 He concluded that it was from
“these two misguided lines of precedent” that the Court was able to reach its
decision in both the Berman and Midkiff cases. 171
IV. AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS
The defeat of individual property rights advocates in the Kelo case has
caused the Supreme Court to come under criticism. 172 The criticism has
originated from various entities, 173 but the message seems to be that the Kelo
decision has effectively robbed the Fifth Amendment of its public use
requirement. 174 This barrage of criticism, while not completely without merit,
is better placed on the potential effects of the decision rather than the legal
analysis used to reach it. Despite the large public backlash, the Kelo decision
was not an abdication of duty by the Supreme Court as the dissent claimed.175
In fact, the Court thoroughly examined and applied the years of legal precedent
before it in reaching its decision. 176 If anything, the Supreme Court could be
criticized for simply applying the precedents without weighing the potential
effects of its decision. The Kelo decision was not the result of a sudden
ideological shift in the Court, but rather the final result of eminent domain
decisions which over time have demonstrated the Supreme Court’s willingness
to defer to legislative determinations. 177
Ironically, in spite of the apparent setback to individual property rights in
the United States, the Kelo decision can provide property rights advocates just
169. 160 U.S. 668 (1896). The issue in Gettysburg was whether the government had the
power to take land in order to build memorials on the former war site. Id. at 679.
170. Kelo, 125 S. Ct at 2684.
171. Id. at 2685 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
172. See generally Fuhrmeister, supra note 6.
173. In November, the United States House of Representatives voted 376 to 38 to pass an act
which threatened to cut off federal funding to states that seized homes for private commercial use
as a form of economic development. The legislation is currently in the Senate and it is known as
the Private Property Protection Act. See Warren Richey, Eminent Domain in State Hands,
CINCINNATI POST, Dec. 15, 2005, available at http:/news.cincypost.com/apps/pbcs.dll/
article?AID=/20051215/NEWS01/512150362.
174. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct at 2671 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 2677.
176. See infra pp. 20-24.
177. See Charles Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument
for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491 (2006) and Paul
W. Tschetter, Kelo v. New London: A Divided Court Affirms the Rational Basis Standard of
Review in Evaluating Local Determinations of ‘Public Use.’ 51 S.D. L. REV. 193 (2006) for the
proposition tht the Kelo case was decided correctly as a matter of law, but contrast with Orlando
E. Delogu, Kelo v. City of New London—Wrongly Decided and a Missed Opportunity for
Principled Line Drawing with Respect to Eminent Domain Takings, 58 ME. L. REV. 17 (2006).
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the ammunition needed to stem the erosion. It must not be overlooked that the
Supreme Court essentially requested that the state legislatures solve the
eminent domain dilemma themselves. 178 This apparent invitation, combined
with the extraordinary publicity of this issue, can pave the way for restrictive
eminent domain legislation across the country. Currently Alabama, Delaware,
Texas, and Ohio have used the outcry against the Kelo decision to enact
restrictive legislation, and Missouri needs to take this opportunity to follow
suit in order to limit the scope of eminent domain powers. 179
A.

Limited Scope of Review for Kelo

The position of the Supreme Court is summed up by Justice Stevens in one
phrase. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, notes that in regards to
eminent domain decisions, the Supreme Court has a “longstanding policy of
deference to legislative judgments in this field.” 180 The Kelo decision is the
apex of that deferential policy. The dissent attempts to distinguish the past
cases of Berman and Midkiff, on which the majority heavily relies, from the
Kelo facts, but it simply holds no weight because to rule against the legislature
in this case would require the Court to turn its back on years of legislative
deference. 181
The notion of legislative deference in eminent domain decisions begins
with the concept of a state exercising its police powers. Police powers allow a
sovereign “to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort,
and quiet of all persons.” 182 The extent and scope of these powers has no
readily defined limit in United States jurisprudence, and as such, there is a
narrow role for judicial review when a state acts under its police powers. 183

178. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668 (“In affirming the City’s authority to take petitioners’
properties, we do not minimize the hardship that condemnations may entail, notwithstanding the
payment of just compensation. We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State
from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.”).
179. See ALA CODE § 11-47-170; DEL CODE ANN TIT. 29, § 9505 (2005); S.B. 167, 126th
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2206.001 (Vernon 2005).
180. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663.
181. See id. at 2668 (“Because over a century of our case law interpreting that provision
dictates an affirmative answer to that question, we may not grant petitioners the relief that they
seek.”).
182. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985); see also City of Columbus v.
Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 439 (2002) (holding that public safety falls
within the police power); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001) (holding that
control of advertising is within the police power); Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 21
(2000) (holding that the establishment of regulatory or licensing schemes are within the police
power); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S.470, 485 (1996) (holding that the regulation of
compensation through tort remedies was within the police power).
183. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (“An attempt to define [police powers]
reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each case must turn on its own facts. The definition
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Additionally, it is the legislature’s role, not the judiciary’s, to determine the
location, method, and purpose of the application of these broad powers. 184
The Supreme Court has previously recognized the power of eminent
domain to be “equated with the police power,” 185 and thus the public use
requirement embedded within the power of eminent domain is “coterminous
with the scope of the sovereign’s police powers.” 186 Consequently, whenever
a state chooses to use eminent domain, it is subject only to minimal review by
a court. 187 In fact, the Supreme Court wrote in Midkiff that “it will not
substitute its judgment for a legislature’s judgment as to what constitutes a
public [purpose] ‘unless the [purpose] be palpably without reasonable
foundation.’” 188 Essentially, the only question left to the judiciary after Midkiff
was to determine whether the legislature had reasonable grounds to claim a
proposed project could benefit the public.
The dissent claims that the Kelo case is an “issue of first impression,” 189
and while this might be true with regard to a proposed taking for the purpose of
economic development, it was of no bearing on the outcome of this decision.
Under the scope of review, as laid out by Berman and Midkiff, the Supreme
Court had to ask and answer one question in the case. So even though the
majority claims that the case “turn[ed] on the question whether the City’s
development plan serves a ‘public purpose,’” 190 it is better stated that the case
actually turned on whether the proposed economic development could
reasonably benefit the public.
The controlling precedents dictated the Supreme Court’s scope of review.
The only determination relative to the outcome of the case was the
government’s ability to show that the proposed construction plan and
subsequent economic development were reasonably going to benefit the
public. Once that determination was made, the Supreme Court theoretically
reached the limits of its scope of review because of the deference afforded to
the legislature. This is exactly how the majority proceeded and decided the
case. 191 The dissent authored by Justice O’Connor, curiously chides the
is essentially the product of legislative determinations addressed to the purposes of government,
purposes neither abstractly nor historically capable of complete definition.”).
184. See id. (“In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the
public needs to be served by social legislation . . . . This principle admits of no exception merely
because the power of eminent domain is involved.”).
185. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S 229, 240 (1984).
186. See id.
187. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
188. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241 (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. R.R. Co., 160 U.S.
668, 680 (1896)).
189. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2673 (2005) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
190. See id. at 2663.
191. See supra, note 177.
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majority for placing “special emphasis” on the particular facts of the case and
concludes that “none has legal significance.” 192 However, when deciding
whether a development plan and its proposed economic benefits are reasonably
going to benefit the public, one has no choice but to look at particular facts of a
case to make this determination. Consequently, the majority examined the
condition of proposed condemned land, the economy of the surrounding area,
the scope of the development plan, and its projected benefits before concluding
that the plan itself was reasonable. 193 It was these particular facts, along with
the scope of review from Berman and Midkiff, which not only had legal
significance, but were dispositive in reaching the majority’s decision.
The dissent claims that the “Court’s holdings in Berman and Midkiff were
true to the principle underlying the Public Use Clause,” 194 thus implying that
Kelo somehow was not. This characterization of Kelo is completely
inaccurate. The outcomes of both the Berman and Midkiff decisions were not
dictated by the specific intended public purpose of each case. Rather, those
takings were held constitutional because the Court recognized its limited scope
of review and decided that it should not substitute its own judgment for that of
the legislature when determining a public use. This was the same principled
analysis applied to the Kelo case. 195
The dissent stresses the fact that in both of the prior cases, a harmful use
was eliminated. 196 However, neither of the prior holdings ever specified that
the elimination of a harmful use was necessary or required to make a taking
under eminent domain constitutional. The fact that in the Kelo case there was
no claim that the city was removing a harmful use was immaterial. The crucial
determination in those cases was that the Court would be hesitant to question
the legislature’s determination as to what constitutes a public purpose. 197 The
surviving principle of the Public Use Clause from Berman and Midkiff was
judicial deference to the legislature. Therefore, even though the Kelo case
presented a different public purpose, it was irrelevant “because Berman and
Midkiff dictate[d] the outcome of [the Kelo] case based not on their specific
public purposes, but on their jurisprudential attitude.” 198
The Supreme Court did not abdicate its duty as the dissent claimed. 199 It
applied a century of case law in order to reach its decision. 200 Under the scope

192. See id. at 2676 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor believes the findings of the
legislature to be nothing but mere “prognostications.” Id.
193. See id. at 2665.
194. See id. at 2674 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
195. See Cohen, supra note 177.
196. Id.
197. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663.
198. See Respondents’ Brief in Opposition for Writ of Certiorari at 12, Kelo, 125 S. Ct. 2655
(No. 04-108).
199. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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of review outlined in Midkiff and Berman for eminent domain, the question to
be answered was whether the stated public purpose, economic development,
would reasonably benefit the public. The majority found it to be, and thus
found in favor of New London after determining that economic development
was a public use.
B.

Lingering Questions

The Kelo case was decided correctly based on precedent, but it is very easy
to understand why the public reacted so negatively to the outcome. 201
Seemingly, all property is subject to eminent domain after the Kelo decision. 202
The majority, while adhering to its past cases, did not address the many
concerns of the dissenting Justices. In her dissent, Justice O’Connor notes that
“[n]othing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a RitzCarlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory.” 203
Justice Stevens merely dismisses these possibilities by noting that if such case
ever were to arise that the Court would deal with it in the future. 204 The
majority has no satisfactory answer to these hypotheticals, and it is because of
this lack of answers that restrictive eminent domain legislation needs to be
passed to provide assurances to individual property rights advocates. Exactly
what are the limits whenever a state decides to exercise its eminent domain
powers against its citizens? An individual knows that they will be paid a
compensation, but that appears to be the only bright line rule after Kelo. The
fear that the government will begin to take peoples’ homes and give the land to
any business with a development plan is overstated, but it exists because of the
broadness of the public use requirement and the Court’s deferential attitude
towards the legislature.
Another question left unanswered in the wake of the decision is what
exactly is the difference between a public taking and private taking? 205
Seemingly, there is no difference after Kelo. The majority notes that the
creation of new jobs and additional tax revenue benefited the public in Kelo;
therefore, the taking was not a purely private taking so as to make it

200. Id. at 2668.
201. Different public opinion polls show public opposition has ranged from anywhere from
seventy percent to ninety percent in the wake of the Kelo decision. See Richey, supra note 173.
202. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2671 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
203. See id. at 2676.
204. See id. at 2667 (“[Hypotheticals] do not warrant the crafting of an artificial restriction on
the concept of public use.”).
205. See id. at 2671 (“To reason, as the Court does, that the incidental public benefits
resulting from the subsequent ordinary use of private property render economic development
takings ‘public use’ is to wash out any distinction between private and public use of
property . . . .”).
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unconstitutional. 206 That distinction, however, creates more questions than it
answers. What type of property use could not be said to create some kind of
ancillary benefit for the public? 207 Is there a certain amount of tax revenue
which needs to be created? Essentially, if a government takes property from
one private citizen and transfers it to another, will it ever fail the public
purpose test as outlined in Kelo so long as some benefit is realized by the
public? 208 Consequently, if no transfer ever fails the public purpose test, what
restraints are there on the government’s power of eminent domain except that
compensation is paid to the displaced landowners? 209 The majority’s decision
does not address these concerns, and as a result many individual citizens fear
that their property could be the future target of an eminent domain action if
restrictive legislation is not passed.
C. The Kelo Compromise: The Majority’s Decision to Place Power in the
State’s Hands
Despite the majority’s holding, it is not entirely clear that they truly
believed in what they were writing. In fact, the majority may very well have
been troubled by those lingering questions discussed in the previous section.
As noted earlier, the holding was based on sound legal principles and stare
decisis, but those two notions are of little comfort to individual property rights
advocates across the country. Likewise, it appears that the majority was
somewhat skeptical with the result despite their principled decision.
First, the opinion goes out of its way to acknowledge the consternation that
those individuals who lose their homes may feel. 210 The majority clearly
sympathizes with an individual who will lose a home to a business. Secondly,
the opinion readily acknowledges that the “wisdom and necessity” of
condemnations for the purpose of economic development would still be
important topics of public debate, thus revealing their trepidation as to the
concept of economic development takings. 211 However, the most telling sign
of the majority’s uneasiness with their own decision was its invitation to the
states to restrict eminent domain powers as they saw fit. 212 The opinion even
provides examples of some restrictive legislation already in place at the time of

206. Id. at 2665.
207. Id. at 2675 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
208. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2675.
209. Id.
210. See id. at 2668 (“In affirming the City’s authority to take petitioner’s properties, we do
not minimize the hardship that condemnations may entail, notwithstanding the payment of just
compensation.”).
211. Id.
212. Id.
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the Court’s decision. 213 None of these acknowledgements or examples given
by the majority was necessary in the opinion, but obviously they felt inclined
to include the words. In fact, the entire final paragraph of the opinion has no
legal relevance to the holding. It appears that the majority was requesting
legislative action to better define the scope of eminent domain because they
were not comfortable with the state of eminent domain law after Kelo.
The majority may have felt trapped between their skepticism of the
wisdom of economic development takings and the legal precedents before
them. They chose to apply the legal precedents to the Kelo facts, but allowed
some of their skepticism to show in the end. Had Berman or Midkiff never
occurred, the decision of Kelo may have been different, but it is hard to
speculate. Ultimately, had the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners
from Fort Trumbull, the Court would have been turning its back on one
hundred years of precedent. Rather than create chaos, the majority made a
decision to adhere to the principles established in Berman and Midkiff but still
invited the states to define eminent domain as they wished.
Ironically, despite the defeat in the Kelo case, property rights advocates
may end up winning in the long run. Instead of sulking over the Supreme
Court’s decision, property rights advocates need to take advantage of the
opportunity the Court gave them. The majority’s opinion pointed out that the
power and control of eminent domain lies in the hands of the states.214
Consequently, it is up to them to curb the erosion of individual property rights
in the United States. The Supreme Court has invited the states to enact
restrictive legislation, and Alabama, Delaware, Texas, and Ohio have taken up
their offer. 215 The State of Missouri needs to follow the lead of these proactive
states to preserve the property rights of its citizens.
D. States’ Response to Kelo 216
With the power to restrict eminent domain squarely in the hands of state
legislatures, the effects of Kelo can be mitigated. If proper legislation is
enacted, concerned citizens will not have to fear that their home will be the
next home taken for economic development purposes as those homes were in
the Kelo case. Four states have enacted legislation restricting the use of

213. See id. In California, a city may take land for economic development purposes only in
blighted areas. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 33030-33037 (West 1997).
214. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668.
215. See ALA CODE § 11-47-170; DEL CODE ANN. TIT. 29, § 9505 (2005); S.B. 167, 126th
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2206.001 (Vernon 2005).
216. See Timothy Sandefur, The “Backlash” So Far: Will Citizens Get Meaningful Eminent
Domain Reform?, A.L.I.-American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education (Jan. 5-7, 2006)
for the proposition that reform measures taken in Alabama, Texas, Delaware, and Ohio still
contain loopholes for abuse of eminent domain.
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eminent domain, 217 and while none of these amendments is exactly the same,
the effects of these amendments are. The measures passed by these states
range from complete bans on property takings for economic development to
enhanced regulatory processes requiring greater community involvement
earlier in the process. 218 Likewise, numerous other states have legislation
pending that should be voted on in the upcoming year. 219
1. Alabama 220
Alabama has banned all economic development takings as a result of the
Kelo decision. 221 The legislation in Alabama is very specific and the language
of the amendment is seemingly lifted straight from the Kelo holding. 222 The
Alabama State Senate passed the restrictive legislation during a special session
in 2005 immediately following the controversial holding. 223 The legislation
does not provide a precise definition of what constitutes a public use, but it
does create specific bright line standards for what cannot be considered a
public use. Specifically, the Alabama amendment provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a municipality . . . may not
condemn property for the purposes of private retail, office, commercial,
industrial, or residential development; or primarily for enhancement of tax
revenue; or for transfer to a person, nongovernmental entity, public-private
partnership, corporation, or other business entity. Provided, however, the
provisions of this subsection shall not apply to the use of eminent domain by
any municipality . . . based upon a finding of blight . . . but just compensation,
in all cases, shall continue to be first made to the owner. 224

The Alabama legislature has essentially rendered the Kelo holding
meaningless in its state. By passing the ban on economic development takings,
the power to transfer private properties to other private individuals exists only
upon a finding of blight. 225 This is the same exception which was held
217. Id.
218. See Richey, supra note 173.
219. Id.; see also National Conference, supra note 10 (At least eleven other states have
legislation pending on eminent domain restrictions.).
220. Alabama had at least six bills introduced into either the House of Representatives or the
Senate which failed before their restrictive eminent domain legislation was enacted. National
Conference, supra note 10.
221. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. ALA. CODE § 11-47-170 (2005).
225. The Alabama legislature has found that blight:
[C]onstitute[s] a serious and growing problem, injurious to the public health, safety,
morals, and welfare of the residents of the state; that the existence of such areas
contribute[s] substantially and increasingly to the spread of disease and crime, constitutes
an economic and social liability imposing onerous burdens which decrease the tax base
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constitutional in the Berman case. 226 This amendment gives the government
sufficient power to ensure the growth of communities by removing blight, but
it does not does allow such broad powers as the Kelo case. Economic
development is no longer a viable public use in Alabama.
2. Delaware
The Delaware restrictive eminent domain legislation reads as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the acquisition of
real property through the exercise of eminent domain by any agency shall be
undertaken, and the property used, only for the purposes of a recognized public
use as described at least 6 months in advance of the institution of
condemnation proceedings: (a) in a certified planning document; (b) at a public
hearing held specifically to address the acquisition; or (c) in a published report
of the acquiring agency. 227

Delaware’s legislation is slightly different than the legislation passed in
Alabama. As opposed to delineating specific projects eminent domain
proceedings cannot be used for, Delaware simply restricts eminent domain
acquisitions to those public uses which have already been recognized in the
state. The effects, however, are the same. Delaware has previously recognized
that property can be transferred to another private party upon a showing of
blight, but not merely for economic development. 228 The restrictive eminent
domain powers in Delaware are basically the same as those in Alabama. The

and reduce tax revenues, substantially impairs or arrests sound growth, retards the
provision of housing accommodations . . . [and] are focal centers of disease, promote[s]
juvenile delinquency, and consume[s] an excessive proportion of public revenues because
of . . . police, fire, accident, [and] hospitalization . . . .
§ 11-99-1 (2005)
226. See supra text accompanying notes 43-51.
227. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 9505 (2005).
228. In Delaware a “blighted area” means:
[T]hat portion of a municipality or community which is found and determined to be a
social or economic liability to such municipality or community because of any of the
following conditions:
a. The generality of buildings used as dwellings . . . are substandard . . . as to be
conducive to unwholesome living;
b. The discontinuance of the use of any building . . . ;
c. Unimproved vacant land, which has remained so for a period of 10 years . . . ;
d. Areas (including slum areas) with buildings or improvements which by reason of
dilapidation . . . are detrimental to the safety, health, morals, or welfare of the
municipality or community;
e. A growing or total lack of proper utilization of areas . . . resulting in a stagnant and
unproductive condition of land potentially useful and valuable for contributing to and
serving the public health, safety and welfare . . . .
tit. 31, § 4501 (2005).
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state can transfer property through eminent domain to another private party
only for blight. 229
This restrictive legislation also goes a step further than the Alabama
legislation because it increases the regulatory process required of entities using
eminent domain. Any time eminent domain power is to be used, the
government must present the public with a certified plan and must hold a
public hearing at least six months before any condemnations can proceed. 230
At the very least an extra burden has been placed on the government in order to
grant citizens more time to prepare for their dislocation. However, citizens
may use this time to ask additional questions or challenge any legal issues
which may present themselves during the process. In short, Delaware goes
beyond simply restricting eminent domain capabilities. Delaware’s additional
regulatory requirements place more power in the hands of the ordinary citizen
affected by eminent domain than before the Kelo decision.
3. Texas 231
The Texas legislature took the same broad approach that the Alabama
legislature did, a complete ban on all economic development takings. In a
similar fashion, the amendment banning economic development takings
seemed to borrow language straight from the Kelo decision. Specifically the
amendment reads:
A governmental or private entity may not take private property through the use
of eminent domain if the taking:
(1) confers a private benefit on a particular private party through the use of the
property;
(2) is for a public use that is merely a pretext to confer a private benefit on a
particular private party; or
(3) is for economic development purposes, unless the economic development
is a secondary purpose resulting from municipal community development or
municipal urban renewal activities to eliminate an existing affirmative harm on
society from slum or blighted areas . . . . 232

A notable difference in the Texas legislation is the restriction of eminent
domain authority if the public use is declared to be a pretext to confer a benefit
on a private party. This restriction adds one more step to the judicial process
regarding eminent domain. The courts must now determine if any pretext
229. Id.
230. See supra text accompanying note 227.
231. Texas failed to pass four bills in either the House of Representatives or Senate prior to
enacting the current restrictive eminent domain legislation. See National Conference, supra note
10.
232. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2206.001 (Vernon 2005).
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exists for any proposed public use. This additional step is one more hurdle the
government must overcome to exercise eminent domain power, and thus one
more safeguard for individual property owners. The courts in Texas now have
a duty to truly examine the decisions and motives of the legislature and are not
bound by the precedents of legislative deference as the Supreme Court was in
Kelo.
Texas does not take the additional regulatory steps that Delaware did, but
instead has given its courts broader powers to review proposed eminent
domain takings. Private property in Texas will not be transferred to other
private citizens for economic development. The state can transfer property
through eminent domain to another private party only for blight. 233
4. Ohio
The Ohio legislature has taken a more cautious approach to its eminent
domain legislation. The legislation creates a moratorium on economic
development takings in order to study the effects of eminent domain in Ohio.
The legislation declares:
[U]ntil December 31, 2006, a moratorium on the use of eminent domain by
any entity of the state government or any political subdivision of the state to
take, without the owner’s consent, private property that is in an unblighted area
when the primary purpose for the taking is economic development that will
ultimately result in ownership of the property being vested in another private
person, to create the Legislative Task Force to Study Eminent Domain and Its
Use and Application in the State, and to declare an emergency. 234

Rather than pass legislation amid all the controversy of the Kelo decision, the Ohio
legislature will look at the current state of the law of eminent domain in Ohio.
This moratorium may not satisfy individual property rights advocates, but the
language of the declaration does effectively outlaw Kelo-type takings for at least a
year.

V. A CALL FOR EMINENT DOMAIN REFORM IN MISSOURI
Currently in Missouri, eminent domain is a well publicized topic. On July
12, 2005, three weeks after the Kelo ruling, Sunset Hills officials decided to
allow eighty-five residents’ homes and small businesses to be condemned
233. Texas defines a “blighted area” as:
[A]n area that is not a slum area, but that, because of deteriorating buildings, structures, or
other improvements; defective or inadequate streets, street layout, or accessibility;
unsanitary conditions; or other hazardous conditions, adversely affects the public health,
safety, morals, or welfare of the municipality and its residents, substantially retards the
provision of a sound and healthful housing environment, or results in an economic or
social liability to the municipality.
§ 374.003.
234. S.B. 167, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005).
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through eminent domain to make way for a shopping mall and offices. 235
Likewise, the city of Arnold has expressed an interest in razing thirty homes
and fifteen small businesses, including the Arnold VFW, for a Lowe’s Home
Improvement Store, and a strip mall because its need for more revenues. 236
Municipalities are using the Kelo decision to push forward economic
development plans at the expense of its citizens, and the Missouri legislature
needs to enact restrictive legislation to preserve its citizens’ individual property
rights.
If one were to take a quick glance at the Missouri Constitution, it may
appear that the possibility of an economic development taking is remote in
Missouri. In fact, it could be argued that Kelo will have no effect on the
eminent domain proceedings because Missouri already has restrictive measures
in the law. 237 This contention, however, fails to recognize that the current
regulations in place do not completely foreclose economic development
takings. In order to shut these loopholes the legislature needs to adopt certain
measures recommended by the Missouri Eminent Domain Task Force in order
to sharpen the definitions of key words in the statutes such as “blighted area”
and “public use.” 238 If these steps are taken, Missouri citizens will have more
certainty that their homes will not be razed for pure economic development
takings because the scope of eminent domain will be narrowed to precise and
clear statutory language.
A.

Current Law in Missouri Does Not Effectively Eliminate Economic
Development Takings

In order to know where to strengthen the law, one must know where the
law is weakest. The current eminent domain law in Missouri is outlined in its
Constitution. 239 It states that an individual’s private property will not be taken
for a private use. 240 However, this private use prohibition is not without
235. See Dana Berliner, Kelo Revisited: Eminent Domain Should Not be Used for Private
Development, CAPITALISM MAGAZINE, Oct. 1, 2005, http://www.capmag.com/articlePrint.asp?
ID=4419.
236. Id.
237. See MISSOURI EMINENT DOMAIN TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 7 (2005) [hereinafter TASK FORCE].
238. Id.
239. MO. CONST. art. I, § 28.
240. The Missouri Constitution provides that:
[P]rivate property shall not be taken for private use with or without compensation, unless
by consent of the owner, except for private ways of necessity, and except for drains and
ditches across the lands of others for agricultural and sanitary purposes, in the manner
prescribed by law; and that when an attempt is made to take private property for a use
alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be public shall be
judicially determined without regard to any legislative declaration that the use is public.
Id.
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exception. 241 Missouri’s Constitution also provides that a city or county may
create ordinances which allow for the redevelopment of blighted areas. 242 The
determination of what property is blighted is a matter for the legislature to
decide. 243 In effect, Missouri law prohibits the use of eminent domain to
acquire land to transfer to a private party unless there is a finding of blight. 244
This blight exception is not unusual. As was discussed earlier, a “blight
exception” exists in each of those states which have already passed restrictive
eminent domain legislation. Accordingly, it would seem that in Missouri a
taking solely for economic development purposes is already outlawed because
there would be no finding of blight. Consequently, it follows that Missouri
does not need to enact any further legislation because restrictive legislation is
already in place to protect against economic development takings.
However, this thought process is flawed. It fails to recognize the
possibility that economic development takings could occur under the auspices
of the blight exception as the law stands today. This possibility exists because
of the broad definition of blight in Missouri and past case history interpreting
its meaning.
Blight is defined as:
[The] portion of the city within which the legislative authority of such

city determines that by reason of age, obsolescence, inadequate or
outmoded design or physical deterioration have become economic and
social liabilities, and that such conditions are conducive to ill health,
transmission of disease, crime or inability to pay reasonable taxes. 245
The concerning portion of this definition is that part of the statute which speaks
in broad terms of an economic liability. An economic liability simply implies
that that portion of the city is not economically advantageous. Does that mean
the land is not being used to its fullest economic potential or that the land is
241. Id. art. 6, § 28.
242. The Missouri Constitution provides that:
Laws may be enacted, and any city or county operating under a constitutional charter may
enact ordinances, providing for the clearance, replanning, reconstruction, redevelopment
and rehabilitation of blighted, substandard or insanitary areas, and for recreational and
other facilities incidental or appurtenant thereto, and for taking or permitting the taking,
by eminent domain, of property for such purposes, and when so taken the fee simple title
to the property shall vest in the owner, who may sell or otherwise dispose of the property
subject to such restrictions as may be deemed in the public interest.
Id.
243. Tierney v. Planned Indus. Expansion Auth. of Kansas City, 742 S.W.2d 146, 150 (Mo.
1987).
244. See generally State ex rel. Dalton v. Land Clearance Auth., 270 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1954);
see also State ex rel. Atkinson v. Planned Indus. Expansion Auth. of St. Louis, 517 S.W.2d 36
(Mo. 1975) (sustaining the urban redevelopment law as it currently stands); Annbar Assoc. v.
West Side Redev. Corp., 397 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1965).
245. MO. ANN. STAT. § 353.020 (West 2005).
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serving no economic purpose at all? The statutory language gives no direction,
and thus it is solely in the government’s power to give meaning to the statute
by its actions. It is not hard to imagine a situation where a solely economic
development taking can be justified under the blight exception.
For example, suppose that there is an area of land which contains low to
middle income housing. The housing is structurally sound, but it is quite old.
There is a moderate crime rate, but it is not out of the ordinary. This land is
also in a municipality struggling for revenue. Looking for ways to stimulate
the municipality, the city council conducts a study which determines that a
shopping mall would provide ten times the revenue housing does. It is further
determined that this additional revenue would allow the municipality to make a
host of improvements from increased police presence in order to lower the
crime rate to higher educational funding to create better schools. The city now
crafts a well developed plan to raze the houses in order to build a mall. 246
Currently, very little stops the city from using Missouri’s blight statutes to turn
this land into a shopping mall simply for economic development.
Consider that the determination of blight is a legislative determination. 247
After examining the blight statute, the city determines the area can be blighted
because the area is outdated and consequently not reaching its potential in
terms of tax revenue as compared to the shopping mall. 248 The area can be
considered an economic liability in terms of the statutory language. 249
Likewise, the existing conditions are more conducive to a higher crime rate
than the proposed use would be. Once that determination is made, courts
cannot substitute their judgment unless the original decision is found to be
unreasonable. 250 It is highly unlikely a court would consider a lower crime
rate and higher education funding unreasonable. Once this area is deemed
blighted, the city could accept contract proposals and eventually transfer the
land to a private developer. 251 In effect, it is plausible that a Missouri city
could engineer an economic development taking similar to Kelo under current
Missouri law despite the blight requirement.
While this is only a hypothetical, Missouri courts have considered
situations similar to these in the past and have held that land can be blighted

246. “An authority shall not recommend a plan to the governing body of the city until a
general plan for the development of the city has been prepared.” Id. § 100.400 (2005). In the
hypothetical, the city could also create an Urban Redevlopment Corporation under MO. ANN.
STAT § 353.110 to acquire land through eminent domain. See TASK FORCE, supra note 237, at
19.
247. See Tierney, 742 S.W.2d at 150.
248. See TASK FORCE, supra note 237.
249. Id.
250. Tierney, 742 S.W.2d at 150.
251. Allright Mo., Inc. v. Civic Plaza Redev. Corp., 538 S.W.2d 320, 324 (Mo. 1976).
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simply because of economic under utilization. 252 In Tierney v. Planned
Industrial Expansion Authority 253 (“PIEA”) the City Counsel of Kansas City
designated land as blighted because of economic underutilization and
subsequently developed a reconstruction plan. 254 PIEA eventually accepted a
contract proposal from a developer for the land. 255 The owners of some of
these properties in the redevelopment plan contended that these designations
were unreasonable so as to have the court overturn the blight designation. 256
The court, however, deferred to the legislative determination of blight. 257
Likewise, the owners argued that the city’s concept of economic under
utilization was too broad and dangerous. 258 The court did not find this
argument persuasive, instead ruling that because “urban land is scarce,” and
because there is a problem assembling large enough tracts of land, “industrial
development is a proper public purpose.” 259
The idea of blighting land because of economic under utilization is
synonymous with taking land for economic development. It appears that
Missouri law is relatively close to the federal baseline of eminent domain
established in Kelo. Likewise, it would mean that all land is theoretically
subject to eminent domain takings because economic under utilization is a
valid reason to blight property. Based on case history and the current statutes,
the law in Missouri needs to be strengthened so that the possibility of
economic development takings cannot continue under the blight exception.
B.

The Missouri Eminent Domain Task Force’s Role

In response to the Kelo decision, Governor Matt Blunt created the Missouri
Eminent Domain Task Force (“Task Force”) to study the eminent domain law

252. See Tierney, 742 S.W.2d at 151; Crestwood Commons Redev. Corp., v. 66 Drive-In,
Inc., 812 S.W.2d 903, 910 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
253. Tierney, 742 S.W.2d 146.
254. Id. at 150.
255. Id. The PIEA accepted a contract proposal from the K-A Company which was different
than the reconstruction plan originally approved by City Plan Commission three months earlier.
See id.
256. Id. Tierney’s land was not originally designated as blighted. His land became part of
the redevelopment project after the PIEA accepted an altered plan from the K-A Company. See
id.
257. See id. (“[The Council’s] authority controls unless its decision is shown to be so arbitrary
and unreasonable as to amount to an abuse of legislative process.”).
258. Id. at 151. Tierney raised arguments very similar to those which the dissent in Kelo
raised. He suggested that economic under utilization was “so broad as to confer upon the
legislative authority and the PIEA the unlimited discretion to take one person’s property for the
benefit of another” because “almost all land could be put to a higher and better use.” See id.
259. Tierney, 742 S.W.2d at 151.
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in the state. 260 In particular, the Task Force was directed to “analyze current
state . . . laws governing eminent domain and recommend any changes that
would enhance the effectiveness of these laws;” “[t]o develop a definition of
‘public use’ that allows state and local government to use eminent domain
when there is a clear an direct public purpose while at the same time ensuring
that individual property rights are preserved;” and “[t]o develop criteria to be
applied by state and local governments when the use of eminent domain is
being proposed.” 261 The Task Force presented its recommendations to
Governor Matt Blunt on December 30, 2005. 262 In total, the Task Force
recommended eighteen proposals so as to improve eminent domain law in
Missouri. 263 If a combination of these recommendations is adopted in
Missouri, citizens’ property rights will be preserved despite the Kelo ruling
because the government will have defined substantive limitations to the
legislature’s ability to exercise eminent domain to transfer property to other
private parties.
C. Course of Action for Missouri Eminent Domain Law
1. Reforming the Definition of Blight
The first recommendation is to sharpen the definition of blight. As
discussed above, it is plausible to see how the blight exception could be
manipulated. 264 Likewise, the Task Force noted that “the current definition of
blight has been abused by condemning authorities by making determinations of
blight” in unreasonable areas. 265 There needs to be an objective standard or
some additional factors added to the definition of blight so as to create a better
guideline to ensure more consistency in legislative determinations of blight. 266
This new definition should also explicitly state that economic under utilization
is not a proper reason to declare a property blighted. 267

260. The Task Force met a total of ten times prior to issuing its final report. During their
commission, they heard from over fifty witnesses providing eminent domain testimony. See TASK
FORCE, supra note 237, at 6.
261. See id.
262. The recommendations are broken down into three categories. The first category is about
redefining the scope of eminent domain; the second category is about improving the procedure
required for exercising eminent domain; and the third category provides penalties to condemning
authorities if they attempt to abuse the process. See id.
263. Id.
264. See discussion supra text Part V.
265. See TASK FORCE, supra note 237, at 25.
266. Id.
267. Id.
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A possible model of reform for Missouri is to incorporate the legislative
findings of Alabama into its blight statute. 268 A key portion of the legislative
findings determined that blight “necessitate excessive and disproportionate
expenditures of public funds for crime prevention and punishment, public
health and safety, fire and accident protection and other public services and
facilities.” 269 This type of statute forces the entity seeking a blight designation
to at least show that the particular area is costing the state more in preventative
measures than the average municipality. Adjustments have to be made for
population and geographic size difference between municipalities, but it would
at least create a statewide baseline and a more objective frame of reference for
determining blight.
2. Define “Public Use”
The second recommendation for Missouri is to define the term “public
use” as it will apply to eminent domain. One of the goals given to the Task
Force was to develop a definition which allows municipalities to use eminent
domain, but also one which protects property rights. 270 The definition which
the Task Force agreed upon is:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, neither this state
nor any political subdivision . . . shall use eminent domain unless it is
necessary for a public use. The term “public use” shall only mean the
possession, occupation, and enjoyment of the land by the general public, or by
public agencies; or the use of land for the creation or functioning of public
utilities or common carriers; or the acquisition of abandoned or blighted
property.
The public benefits of economic development, including an increase in tax
base, tax revenues, employment, or general economic health, standing alone,
shall not constitute a public use. 271

This statute should be enacted because it encompasses the law of eminent
domain in Missouri into a single statute. Likewise, it clearly and precisely lays
out what can constitute a public use and what cannot. The intent of the
legislature is clear, and this statute is open to very little interpretation. The
statute also accomplishes Governor Blunt’s goal because it is clear when a
municipality may use eminent domain, yet it also restricts the possibility that
private property will be transferred to another private entity for economic
development, thus preserving individual property rights.
Missouri should adopt both the sharpened blight definition and the
proposed public use definition. Together these statutes redefine the scope of
268.
269.
270.
271.

See supra notes 220-26 and accompanying text.
Id.
See TASK FORCE, supra note 237, at 6.
Id. at 22.
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eminent domain law in Missouri. The questions of exactly when and where a
municipality can exercise eminent domain will be largely answered because of
the new definition of public use. Likewise, individual property rights will be
better protected with this recommendation than under the current law in
Missouri because at no time will property be transferred to another private
party without empirical data confirming an area is blighted or because of
economic under utilization. This empirical data will be discovered using
objective standards which diminish the chance of potential abuse and provides
definite standards which will lead to more consistent results in the
determination of blight.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Kelo decision has brought eminent domain to the forefront of
American political and social debate. No matter a person’s views on the
decision, it is clear the Supreme Court applied the same legal principles
established in Berman and Midkiff to the Kelo case. The criticism of Kelo is
not due to the decision itself, but in response to the “green light” given to cities
and developers. Because of Kelo, it is hard to see where a legislature’s
authority to use eminent domain ends. The only hard rule is that compensation
must be paid. The “public use” clause has evolved simply to be the public
benefit clause which is satisfied if the public receives a boost in tax revenue or
employment rates. This is troubling because it means any property could
theoretically be subject to eminent domain.
The Supreme Court, however, apparently understood these concerns. They
have invited the states to enact restrictive legislation to narrow the scope of
eminent domain powers. Alabama, Delaware, Texas, and Ohio have
effectively done just this. Missouri needs to follow these leads by adopting
portions of those laws into their own. Missouri statutes and case law currently
allow eminent domain takings such as Kelo to occur because of economic
under utilization. If Missouri adopts the recommendations of their Eminent
Domain Task Force and tightens the definition of “blight” and defines “public
use,” property rights advocates will not have to fear that their home will be the
next taken for a shopping mall.
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